

R E P O R T S

OF

ADJUDGED CASES

IN THE

Court of Common Pleas

DURING THE TIME

LORD CHIEF JUSTICE WILLES

PRESIDED IN THAT COURT;

TOGETHER WITH SOME FEW CASES OF THE SAME PERIOD DETERMINED

IN THE

HOUSE OF LORDS, COURT OF CHANCERY, AND EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.

Taken from the Manuscripts of Lord Chief Justice Willes.

WITH NOTES AND REFERENCES

TO PRIOR AND SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS,

By CHARLES DURNFORD,

OF THE MIDDLE-TEMPLE, BARRISTER AT LAW.

Dublin.

PRINTED BY JOHN EXSHAW, 98, GRAFTON-STREET.

1800.

1744, 5. or if they cannot be indicted for perjury because the fact was committed in another country. Those therefore who are plainly not liable to be indicted for perjury have often been, and for the sake of justice must be, admitted as witnesses; and so there is an end of this objection.

OMICHOND
against
BARKER.

From what I have said it is plain that my opinion is that these depositions ought to be read in evidence."

F. 18 Geo. 2. **EDWARD EVANS against HENRY KING, otherwise HENRY VAUGHAN KING.**
Monday,
May 18th.

A declaration on promises against John A., otherwise John James A., is bad, for a man cannot have two Christian names.—It is a bad plea in abatement, that the defendant's name of baptism is not so and so.

HENRY King, otherwise *Henry Vaughan King*, of &c was attached to answer *Edward Evans*. The declaration, which was in assumpsit for work and labour, described the defendant by the name of *Henry*.

The defendant pleaded in abatement, thus; *Henry Vaughan King*, who was attached by the name of *Henry King* says that he is not nor can be understood to be the same person against whom the said *Edward* hath brought his action, because his name of baptism is *Henry Vaughan* and his surname *King*, and by the same name hath always been named and called, without this that his name of baptism is that of *Henry* alone, or by the name of baptism of *Henry* alone he was ever named or called &c.

The plaintiff replied that the said *Henry Vaughan* is and at the time of suing forth the original writ and long before was called and known as well by the name of *Henry* alone as by the said name of *Henry Vaughan* &c; and this he prays may be enquired of by the country.

The defendant demurred, and shewed for cause that the plaintiff replied new matter, and had concluded his replication to the country, when he ought to have concluded with an averment.

This case was argued on *Wednesday* the 15th of *May* by *Belfield* Serjt. for the defendant, and by *Draper* Serjt. for the plaintiff; and the opinion of the Court was now given by

1745.
Evans
against
King

Willes, Lord Chief Justice (after stating the pleadings,) as follows.

“ Upon this demurrer it comes now before the Court; and objections have been taken by my Brother *Belfield* to the declaration and the replication, and by my Brother *Draper* to the plea.

The objection to the declaration was, that the defendant is sued by two Christian names, whereas a man cannot have two Christian names at one and the same time; and for this my Brother *Belfield* cited *Panton v. Chowles*, *Moor* 89^r; *Field v. Winlow*, *Cro. Eliz.* 897; and *Watkins v. Oliver*, *Cro. Jac.* 558. The case in *Moor* of *Panton v. Chowles* is thus; the plaintiff, as administrator of *Eleanor Dancastell*, brought an action of debt against the defendant upon a bond entered into by him; he pleaded that *Eleanor* in her lifetime by the name of *Ellen* released to him all actions and demands: the plaintiff replied non est factum *Eleanoræ*, on which issue was joined, and found for the plaintiff; and upon a motion in arrest of judgment it was holden that the verdict was right, for that a person cannot have two names of baptism at the same time. But the pleadings may happen to be so that a person may be concluded by estoppel to say that his name is otherwise than that by which he has signed a deed (a). The case of *Field v. Winlow* in *Cro. Eliz.* is thus; in debt on bond the plaintiff declared that the defendant *James* by the name of *John Winlow* bound himself in a bond to the plaintiff; the defendant prayed oyer of the bond, and it appeared that the defendant had bound himself by the name of *John*, to which the defendant demurred; and all the Court held that the action lay not, for *John* cannot be *James* (b). The case of *Watkins v. Oliver*, in *Cro. Jac.* is much the strongest

(a) Vid. *Smithson v. Smith*, E. 17 C. 2. sup. 461.

(b) But if the defendant had been sued by the name of *John*, and had pleaded in abatement that his name was *James*, the plaintiff might have

replied that the defendant was as well known by the one name as the other, and given in evidence the defendant's signature to the bond by the name of *John*.

1745.

EVANS
against
KING.

of the three. There the plaintiff declared against *Edmund* alias *Edward Watkins*, that he by the name of *Edmund* was bound in a bond for 100*l.*, and for nonpayment the action was brought; the condition was that *Roger Watkins* should pay 50*l.* to the plaintiff upon such a day. The defendant pleaded payment at the day, and issue thereupon, and found for the plaintiff, and judgment for him in the King's Bench. But upon error brought in the Exchequer Chamber the judgment was reversed by all the justices and Barons, for *Edward* is bound and *Edmund* is sued, which cannot be intended to be one and the same person; and no averment can help it, for one cannot have two Christian names, and there can be no estoppel as this case is. The case of *Clarke v. Istead* in 1 *Lutw.* 894. is thus; in debt on a bond the plaintiff declared that Sir *Robert Clarke* the defendant, by the name of *John Clarke*, became bound; the defendant pleaded non est factum, and on a special verdict judgment was given in the King's Bench for the plaintiff: but it was reversed by the whole Court in the Exchequer Chamber. Many cases were cited in 1 *Lutwich* as a foundation for this reversal; among the rest the cases before mentioned and the case of *Shotbolt* in *Dyer* 279. b. Tr. 10 & 11 Eliz. There an action of debt on a bond was brought against *William Shotbolt*; and the plaintiff declared against him by the name of *William Shotbolt* alias *John Shotbolt*: The bond appeared on the evidence to be made and signed by *John Shotbolt*; and upon a special verdict found the Court were of opinion that he could not recover in that action, but that the action ought to have been brought against him by the name of *John*, and then he would have been estopped to say that his name was not *John*; he having signed the bond by that name. Another case likewise is there said to have been afterwards adjudged in the same manner between *Turpin v. Jaxon*, Hil. 18 Eliz. There is also cited in *Lutwich* the case of *Maby v. Shepherd*, where in an action of debt brought against *John* the executor of *Edmund Shepherd*, the bond set forth is said to be the bond of *Edmund*: but uponoyer prayed it appeared that he was called *Edward* in the bond, and though it appeared that he signed it by his right name *Edmund*, and though on non est factum pleaded a verdict was given for the plaintiff, yet

(a) Cro. Jac. 640.

judgment was arrested by the opinion of the whole Court, which was I think going a great way. 1745.

However, whatever might be my own opinion if this were a new point, I think I am obliged by these authorities, which are most of them much stronger than the present case, to be of opinion that the writ and declaration in this case are not good. For these cases are all upon bonds, where there is much more reason to say that the defendant may have two names than in the present case. For in the case of a bond if the action be brought against the defendant by the name mentioned in the bond, he is estopped to say that that is not his name; and to be sure he cannot say that his right name is not his name; so that in that case he may in some sense be said to have two names. But the defendant cannot be said in any sense to have two names in the present case, which is an action on the case upon several promises and neither of them on a note. And therefore as no man can have two names at the same time, this declaration must be wrong. As to what is said in *Salk. 6. (a)*, that a man may have two names, the one of baptism and the other at confirmation, and that after confirmation his name of baptism does not cease, no more can be meant, but that if before confirmation (for a man may not happen to be confirmed until after twenty-one) he executed any thing by his name of baptism he may be sued by that name after his confirmation. But after confirmation he has no other name but the name that he then took (*b*); otherwise the rule would not hold (which yet is certainly true) that a man cannot have two christian names at the same time.

Evans
against
Kings.

As therefore I am of opinion that the declaration is not good, it is immaterial whether the plea or replication be good or not. But as objections have been made to both of them, I will say a little upon each.

And first, as to the plea; I am clearly of opinion that it is not good, for that it is no answer to the plaintiff's declaration. For he only says that his name of baptism is *Henry Vaughan*;

(a) *Holman v. Walden, Salk. 6.* Gwydy, Chief Justice of the Court of
(b) See the instance of *Sir Francis Common Place, Co. Lit. 3. a.*

1745.

EVANS
against
KING.

and traverses that his name of *baptism* is *Henry* alone, or that he was ever called or known by that name of *baptism*, which may be true and yet his name may be *Henry*; for it may be his name of confirmation, or he may be a Jew or a Heathen. And I can find but one precedent of this sort which is that of *Shield v. Cliff*, in *Furesley* 104; and there the plea was over-ruled, and a respondeat ouster awarded. In all the precedents in *Rastall* (a) which were cited, the defendant traverses that the plaintiff was ever called or known by that name, and there is not a word of baptism in any of them. And the plea in 1 *Lutw.* 10, from which it was said that this was copied, is quite different from this; for there the traverse is in these words, absque hoc quod ipse nominatur vel vocatur Robertus seu per idem nomen vel cognomen unquam cognitus seu vocatus fuit &c, and not a word of the name of *baptism*.

Being clearly of opinion that the plea is bad for this reason, I shall say nothing of the other objection to it, that it begins with saying that the defendant was attached by the name of *Henry King*, which is contrary to the declaration.

And being of opinion that the declaration and plea are both bad, I will give no positive opinion on the replication, but I am inclined to think that that is bad likewise for the reason assigned as cause of demurrer; for the plaintiff having alleged new matter, and not barely denied the defendant's plea, he ought to have given the defendant an opportunity of answering it, and so not to have concluded to the country but with a hoc paratus est verificare. The case of *Holman v. Walden*, *Salk.* 6. can be no authority in the present case either on the one side or the other, because there the declaration plea and replication were all different from the present. The defendant is named but by one name in the writ and declaration; in the traverse which is the material part of the plea there is not a word of the name of baptism; and there the replication exactly follows the words of the traverse, and therefore a conclusion to the country was proper. Besides, as the case is reported, I cannot help saying that it is a single case.

(a) *Rast. Entr.* 50; 108; 234.

But upon the strength of the authorities which I have mentioned, I am of opinion that the declaration is not good, and that judgment in abatement must be given for the defendant, that the plaintiff's writ be quashed."

1745.

EVANS
against
KING.

STONE against RAWLINSON and Another.

E. 18 Geo. 2.
Monday,
May 27th.

THIS was an action on a promisory note for fifty guineas made by the defendants dated the 11th of May 1730, and payable to James Watson or order; and the declaration stated that Watson died on the 1st of April 1734 intestate, upon whose death administration of his goods and chattels was granted to Ann Webb, who indorsed the note to the plaintiff.

The executor or administrator of a person, to whose order a promisory note is made payable, may assign it over, so as to enable the indorsee to sue in his own name.—But the indorsee need not in his declaration make a profert of the letters of administration &c granted to the indorser. Barnes 164. S. C.

To this declaration the defendants demurred, and shewed for cause that the plaintiff did not bring into the Court, or shew to the Court, any letters of administration of J. Watson's goods granted to Ann, and that he did not shew who granted administration of Watson's effects to the said Ann.

This case was twice argued, the first time in Michaelmas term 1744 by Agar Serjt. for the defendant, and Draper Serjt. for the plaintiff, the second in Hilary term following by Birch King's Serjt. for the former and by Prime King's Serjt. contra. And though Mr. J. Burnett appears at first to have been inclined to give judgment for the defendant, he afterwards agreed with the rest of the Court, whose opinion was now delivered, as follows, by .

Willes, Lord Chief Justice. " This comes before the Court on a demurrer to the plaintiff's replication.

There are two causes of demurrer assigned in the pleadings, 1st, That there is no profert made of the letters of administration;

2dly, That it is not said by whom the letters of administration were granted, so that it does not appear whether they were granted by proper authority.

And

This (PDF) case report was prepared by, and is the copyright of, [Deed Poll Office](#). You are free to use this report for non-commercial purposes, so long as you do not modify this (PDF) document and you keep every part of the report (including this notice) intact.

Find more cases like this at:

<https://deedpolloffice.com/change-name/law/case-law>

<https://deedpolloffice.com/change-name/children/case-law>



Deed • Poll • Office